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Accounting for government guarantees:
perspectives on ﬁscal transparency from
four modes of accounting
DAVID HEALDa* and RON HODGESb
aAdam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK; bBirmingham Business School,
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Government guarantees are increasingly important as a policy instrument in public infrastructure
investment and to assist the banking and ﬁnancial sectors following the global ﬁnancial crisis.
This paper analyses how different modes of accounting characterize such guarantees in the
contexts of public sector ﬁnancial reporting, statistical accounting, budgeting and long-term
ﬁscal projections. Guarantees are difﬁcult to specify for accounting treatment and consistent
conceptualization of liabilities. These difﬁculties make it attractive for governments to treat
obligations as off-budget and off-balance sheet contingent liabilities, rather than recognize
them in ﬁnancial statements and statistical accounts. Miller and Power’s territorializing,
mediating, adjudicating and subjectivizing roles of accounting are utilized to analyse the
reporting of UK government guarantees. Provisioning for guarantees is complex in ﬁnancial
reporting statements and often absent in national accounts, a deﬁciency which Eurostat has
attempted to address by devising the concept of standardized guarantees and by securing more
disclosure of contingent liabilities. There is potential for future research especially where there
is greater mediation between the four modes of government accounting.
Keywords: guarantees; government ﬁnancial reporting; statistical accounting; ﬁscal
transparency
1. Introduction
Two signiﬁcant contemporary developments are shaping the public sectors of many economies:
austerity policies following the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis (Hodges and Lapsley 2016) and ways
that governments account for their activities, notably the recognition of increasing categories of
assets and liabilities (Irwin 2016). The relationship between these developments is contested;
accounting developments are neutral devices designed to enhance transparency in public
sectors (Warren 2015) or biased devices promoting the neo-liberal agenda (Ellwood and New-
berry 2007).
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Governments may substitute, for direct spending, mechanisms not recorded as public expen-
diture. This paper considers the increasing importance of government guarantees as one such
mechanism, for example to support or replace direct public investment in infrastructure. A gov-
ernment guarantee is an arrangement in which a government entity undertakes payment of a debt
or performance of an obligation in the event of a default by the primary creditor. Guarantees can
be explicit (fully articulated) or implicit (derived from unstated understandings) and contractual
(legally enforceable) or non-contractual (promises).
Various schemes involving guarantees became a feature of economic recovery packages after
2008: for example, in the UK, Help-to-Buy mortgages and UK Guarantees for Infrastructure.
While such schemes existed before 2008, the scale of guarantees and their prominence as a
policy instrument have grown signiﬁcantly. Government guarantees to private ﬁrms or to
public entities classiﬁed outside the statistical accounting aggregate of ‘general government’
might constitute government obligations, without being recognized as government liabilities. A
high-proﬁle example in the UK is the proposal to build and operate the nuclear power station
at Hinkley Point C (HPC) in south-west England.1
Our paper aims to provide an understanding of how accounting for such guarantees has the
potential to promote or hinder ﬁscal transparency. We provide UK examples of the recognition
or disclosure of government guarantees and call for further research on the accounting for
these potential obligations. We restrict coverage to explicit guarantees.2
The conceptual contribution of the paper derives from Miller and Power (2013). They per-
ceive accounting as promoting ‘economization’ through which individuals, activities and organ-
izations are constituted as economic actors and entities (p. 560). We employ the four roles of
accounting from their framework – territorializing, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivizing
– as a conceptual lens to analyse uncertainties and technical complexities surrounding the recog-
nition or disclosure of guarantees. We examine the treatment of guarantees using four modes of
government accounting: (1) ﬁnancial reporting based on accounting standards, (2) statistical
accounting leading to the publication of national accounts, (3) budgetary accounting and (4)
long-term ﬁscal sustainability projections.
The paper also considers the development of guarantees in a context of ﬁscal transparency and
the modernization of government accounting. Fiscal transparency has become an internationally
accepted doctrine, promoted by ofﬁcial agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and non-governmental organizations such as the International Budget Partnership as a corrective
to the build-up of government debt:
Fiscal transparency – the comprehensiveness, clarity, reliability, timeliness, and relevance of public
reporting on the past, present, and future state of public ﬁnances – is critical for effective ﬁscal man-
agement and accountability. It helps ensure that governments have an accurate picture of their ﬁnances
when making economic decisions, including [that] of the costs and beneﬁts of policy changes and
potential risks to public ﬁnances. It also provides legislatures, markets, and citizens with the infor-
mation they need to hold governments accountable (IMF 2014).
Fiscal transparency as the basis for external surveillance is necessary when there are international
spillovers of government deﬁcits from one nation state to another, particularly in currency unions
such as the euro. Fiscal surveillance intensiﬁes the role of transparency as a disciplinary technol-
ogy where the economic actor subjected to surveillance is a sovereign state (Heald 2013). Exter-
nal surveillance raises political questions about the legitimacy of technocracy that can override
democracy and technical questions about the accounting systems on which surveillance is based.
The modernization of government accounting has focused attention on the assets, liabilities,
revenues and expenses of the public sector and the basis on which these should be recognized and
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measured. In some jurisdictions, this has involved adopting or adapting accounting methods
designed originally for private sector (for-proﬁt) activities, a process that could be considered
inappropriate (Ellwood and Newberry 2006). Particular issues in adopting or adapting private
sector techniques include the application of fair values (Hodges 2016) and accounting for heritage
assets (Ellwood and Greenwood 2016). The speciﬁcation, recognition and measurement of gov-
ernment liabilities become as important as for assets when governments contract with private
ﬁrms for service delivery or write ﬁnancial instruments, such as guarantees, for facilities made
available at government expense.
The move to accounting standards-based ﬁnancial reporting has emphasized the notion of a
government balance sheet and whole-of-government accounts (WGA) (Chow et al. 2007). The
importance of government-wide consolidation has been stressed by the former Chair of the Inter-
national Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) (Bergmann 2014) and ﬁgures pro-
minently in the case made by Eurostat for its European Public Sector Accounting Standards
project (Heald and Hodges 2015). However, guarantees placed outside the consolidation bound-
ary may avoid recognition as liabilities.3
In the next section, we provide the conceptual structure of the paper. Section 3 outlines our
research methodology. Section 4 presents empirical ﬁndings on the treatment of guarantees
under each of the modes of government accounting in the UK. Section 5 interprets these ﬁndings
in terms of the roles of accounting. Section 6 draws conclusions and implications for further
research.
2. Conceptual structure
This section summarizes the Miller and Power (2013) framework through discussion of the
meaning of economization and the related roles of accounting. It then analyses the four modes
of government accounting. We devise a Government Reporting Preferences Ladder to contrast
government preferences for avoiding recognition and disclosure with the preferences of surveil-
lance organizations for obligation recognition and disclosure.
Economization and the roles of accounting
Miller and Power (2013) perceive accounting as promoting the economization of both insti-
tutional and individual actions. Economization, at the institutional level, results in organizations,
including multinational groupings of states (such as the EU), sovereign states and other public
sector entities (such as sub-national levels of government), being constituted as economic entities.
Economization, at a personal level, causes individuals to ‘ … think of themselves and others as
beings endowed with choices and decisions that can be rendered calculable and governable
… ’ (pp. 560–1). This links to how such choices and decisions are represented by the various
modes of government accounting.
The economization of entities promotes the territorializing, mediating, adjudicating and sub-
jectivizing roles of accounting. Territorializing makes explicit what is ‘government’ by delineat-
ing its boundaries, using ﬁnancial reporting standards in WGA, and through the boundary of
general government in statistical accounting. It determines what are recognized and measured
as ‘ﬁnancial activities’ by the promotion of particular modes of government accounting (although
the quantiﬁcation of these activities may differ between the modes). The result of these territor-
ializing processes is that the activities of organizations are formulated as cost or proﬁt centres in
sectors such as defence (Barton 2004) and healthcare (Ellwood 2009).
The mediating role links together actors and organizations in a collective endeavour in which
accounting provides numbers treated as comparable even when the activities to which they attach
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are not comparable. For example, the levels and ratios of debt of EU Member States are treated as
comparable even though their constitutional, political and environmental conditions vary. Miller
and Power (2013, p. 582) suggest that ambiguity in this mediating role may be important to enable
accounting techniques to take hold. Ambiguity might be created by different perspectives on how
accounting is to be implemented, such as by loose coupling the accounting processes from econ-
omic ideals or intended outcomes (Marriott et al. 2011), or by the construction of measures that
differ between the four modes of government accounting (Heald and Hodges 2015).
The adjudicating role develops because accounting provides a basis for the evaluation of the
performance of calculable spaces. This may be particularly signiﬁcant in assessing the measurement
of success or failure (Miller and Power 2013, p. 584). The adjudicating role is formalized by the
development of ﬁnancial targets, which become accepted as norms within communities and
which are used as the basis for systems of ﬁscal surveillance and discipline. For example, EU
Member States have been set limits for annual deﬁcits (on a statistical accounting basis) of 3%
of GDP and general government gross debt of 60% of GDP (European Council 2008, pp. 279–
80). If these levels are exceeded, a Member State may be forced into an Excessive Deﬁcit Procedure
(EDP), resulting in greater EU scrutiny and possibly external ﬁnancial control of national budgets.
Avoiding this level of deﬁcit or debt becomes highly signiﬁcant for political and economic reasons.
In contrast, whole-of-government ﬁnancial reporting on the IFRS/IPSAS basis is less well estab-
lished, so that its adjudicating role is more limited. There are no EU targets based upon the ﬁnancial
reporting mode of accounting, reﬂecting the lack of comparable information and that economists,
rather than accountants, undertake ﬁscal surveillance.
The subjectivizing role of accounting refers to how organizations and individuals are subject
to regulation and control by others, while retaining the right to choose within constraints deriving
from ﬁnancial norms or standards. For example, governments might have the freedom to choose
to support public infrastructure projects through direct government funding, through Public–
Private Partnerships (PPPs) or by guaranteeing the loans or future income streams of private cor-
porations, with the treatment in the various modes of government accounting inﬂuencing the
choice between these alternative forms of support. The subjectivizing role creates ‘obligations
to perform’ (Miller and Power 2013, p. 583). Yet these obligations can be resisted by various be-
havioural responses which might lead governments to misrepresent their ﬁnancial position (Koen
and van den Noord 2006) as a mechanism for coping with the subjectivizing role of higher pol-
itical authorities (Cohen et al. 2015). High levels of formal compliance might be accompanied by
manipulation around accounting boundaries, such as the general government boundary in statisti-
cal accounting (Irwin 2012), and by arbitrage between accounting standards similar to that in
accounting for PPPs (Hodges and Mellett 2012).
Four modes of government accounting
In addressing guarantees, we focus on four modes of government accounting that each result in
ﬁnancial statements available in the public domain.
Financial reporting, on cash, accruals or some hybrid basis, has parallels with ﬁnancial
reporting in the private sector and is performed by accountants and auditors. In the UK, the par-
ticular government department responsible for the guarantee will recognize or report the guaran-
tee in its own departmental annual report and accounts and the effects are consolidated within the
WGA. The objective of government ﬁnancial reporting is to provide information for the purposes
of accountability and decision-making (IPSASB 2014a, p. 15). Financial reporting is entity-
oriented, based on detailed and systematic records. The accounting treatment of a transaction
might differ between counterparties.4 The potential for inconsistency in reporting increases
when EU governments use different bases of ﬁnancial accounting (Ernst and Young 2012).
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Statistical accounting, the basis for macro-ﬁscal policy and external surveillance, is per-
formed by statisticians, public servants working in government statistical ofﬁces. Statistical
accounting uses ﬁnancial reporting data as input and employs estimation of macroeconomic
data in the compilation of the national accounts. Transactions must be treated symmetrically;
otherwise, sectors will not balance across the national accounts. This leads to what has been
termed the ‘principle of quadruple-entry’ (Lequiller 2015, p. 33), where transactions are recog-
nized in double-entry terms in two sectors.5
Two institutional differences between statistical accounting and ﬁnancial reporting have a
major impact. First, national accounts are prepared in accordance with the United Nations
System of National Accounts (SNA) or, within the EU, the European System of National and
Regional Accounts (ESA). The statistical accounting model is one of periodic revision, rather
than the continuous evolution of IFRS and IPSAS: 2014 was the transition year from ESA95
to ESA10 (Eurostat 2013a). Between these major revisions, changes are relatively modest,
designed to provide clariﬁcations and ﬁll the gaps in relation to emerging issues. Second, statisti-
cal accounting is regulated intergovernmentally; for example, the periodic major revisions of ESA
require the approval of the European Council and the European Parliament.
Differences in the numbers produced by ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting owe
a considerable amount to their separate paths of development. Statistical accounting measures
are generally based on the recognition of ﬁnancial assets and liabilities. For example, in the
calculation of UK government net debt, estimated liabilities (such as provisions for future
pensions or guarantees) are typically excluded from liabilities and non-ﬁnancial assets
(such as property, plant and equipment) are not deducted. In recent years, there has been a
conscious effort to establish whether differences in treatment have a logical basis (reﬂecting
different purposes and uses) or are historical accidents that can in time be eliminated
(IPSASB 2014b).
Government budgeting is the basis of ex ante control and, in democratic countries, the basis of
legislative authorization of public spending. It is performed by public servants of varied bureau-
cratic, legal and accounting backgrounds and is conducted in a public arena in democracies. Bud-
geting is less standardized than either ﬁnancial or statistical accounting, reﬂecting its varying
functions as a tool for targeting and authorizing expenditure and aiding planning, prediction,
coordination and control (Heiling and Chan 2012, van Helden and Hodges 2015, pp. 109–34).
Comparability between countries is low, remaining country and institutionally speciﬁc in terms
of basis and coverage. For example, a survey of government budgeting of OECD countries
reports 21 national governments using a cash basis of budgeting and appropriations (some modi-
ﬁed for commitments and guarantees), 10 countries using an accrual basis (some with simpliﬁed
or incomplete variations) and 3 countries using a mixture of cash and accrual systems (Moretti
2016). There is variable ‘distance’ between the budget numbers and those produced by ﬁnancial
reporting and statistical accounting. The UK Treasury’s (2009) ‘Clear Line of Sight’ project
placed much emphasis on aligning budgeting, ﬁnancial reporting and statistics, but this is one
of a few outliers.
Governments defend their budgeting territory on the grounds of national sovereignty, reﬂect-
ing that this mode of accounting has traditionally received prominence in national political dis-
course and because of its links to democratic institutions (Gray et al. 1993, Heiling and Chan
2012). Forward-looking documents shape ‘who gets what’ in resource allocations, with high pol-
itical salience. Accounting standard setters have a limited impact, though they may attempt to
inﬂuence government budgeting indirectly, as in IPSAS24 on the presentation of budgetary infor-
mation in ﬁnancial statements. Where guarantees become important in this context is when they
are off-budget, so that potentially large future expenditures are not considered within the budget
process.
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Fiscal sustainability projections are constructed on a cash basis to assess sustainability by
economists working in ﬁnance ministries, central banks, and international and supranational
agencies. This mode of accounting has gained prominence in several countries, in part
because of fears about demographic ageing and healthcare costs. The 5-year medium-term
economic forecast provides a platform for 45 years of cash projections, to give 50-year pro-
jections alongside inﬁnite-life projections of sustainability on current policies. Inevitably, such
projections must rest on highly stylized assumptions and encounter difﬁculties in specifying
exactly what constitutes current policy (IPSASB 2013, paras 43–51). The output is the calcu-
lation of ﬁscal gaps that indicate by how much the current ﬁscal stance needs tightening to
secure ﬁscal sustainability.
A signiﬁcant contribution of the early UK Treasury work on ﬁscal sustainability modelling
(Eich 2008) was its schematic presentation of the relationship between modes of government
accounting. The ﬁnancial reporting accrual-based balance sheet recognizes ‘future liabilities
from past activities’. Long-term projections also recognize (a) ‘future liabilities incurred in the
future’ and (b) future revenues, both of which fail the recognition tests of ﬁnancial reporting
and statistical accounting. Such projections therefore have a comprehensive canvas, making it
possible to consider simultaneously future social beneﬁt expenditure and taxation revenue.
In summary, the relationships between these four modes of government accounting are
complex. Government ﬁnancial reporting in some OECD countries has moved towards IFRS/
IPSAS-based systems of accrual accounting. Some countries display alignment between budget-
ing and ﬁnancial reporting practices. There is a greater mutual awareness of the respective roles of
government ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting, and more willingness to eliminate those
differences in treatment that are not the consequence of differences of principle. Less widespread
are ﬁscal sustainability projections, notwithstanding increased concern about the intergenerational
implications of accumulating debt and other government liabilities.
Government reporting preferences ladder for guarantees
Constrained by difﬁcult ﬁscal positions and sometimes by ideological preferences for private
rather than public activity, governments seek ways of ﬁnancing activities that are not recognized.
Such behaviour can be predicted from a public choice view of government as self-interested
budget maximizer, or from observations of government behaviour when under ﬁscal pressure,
evidenced by publications from the IMF (Irwin 2007), the OECD (Koen and van den Noord
2006) and the World Bank (Brixi and Schick 2002). This search to avoid accounting recognition
or disclosure of liabilities coexists with government pronouncements in favour of ﬁscal
transparency.
Consideration of relevant literature, documentary evidence and knowledge of off-balance
sheet reporting practices, such as for PPPs, led to the devising of the ‘Government Reporting Pre-
ferences Ladder for Guarantees’ as a diagnostic tool.
Table 1 is interpreted in the following way. Moving from left to right, the columns distinguish
between: whether guarantees are recognized in government ﬁnancial statements, disclosed within
notes but not recognized, or neither recognized nor disclosed. The rows can be thought of as the
rungs of a ladder, with the bottom rung of the left-hand column representing recognition of the
guarantee as a liability. The ﬁrst right-and-upwards move from liability recognition to disclosure
as quantiﬁable contingent liability reduces visibility. This is compounded by subsequent vertical
moves up the second column as the concept of ‘remote’ is applied and liabilities become unquan-
tiﬁable. A further move is to the right column, for those guarantees falling outside both IAS37 and
the Treasury’s (2015) requirements inManaging Public Money, leading to non-disclosure as well
as non-recognition. Finally, at the top of the third column, there is no disclosure because it is held
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that no government obligation exists. The treatment therefore ranges from liability recognition to
neither recognition nor disclosure.
There is strong pressure from surveillance organizations and civil society organizations for rec-
ognition or disclosure to support transparency and accountability. In contrast, government prefer-
ences for movement in Table 1 are usually to the right and upwards. This inﬂuences policy
design and the choice of instruments. The tightening of ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting
regulations in one arena, such as for PPPs, may provoke ﬁnancial innovation in another. Guarantees
are part of a new generation of ﬁscal risks, particularly given widespread political enthusiasm for
infrastructure spending that cannot be ﬁtted within budgetary constraints (Irwin 2007).
At the bottom left of Table 1, a guarantee is recognized as a government liability. If it can be
shifted from the accounts to the notes, the transaction has escaped recognition within the ﬁnancial
reporting statements and probably also excluded from the aggregates generated by statistical
accounting. Exclusion from the headline numbers in comprehensive income statements and state-
ments of ﬁnancial position might diminish the likelihood of publicity. In the private sector, ‘ …
information recognised in the ﬁnancial statements receives more attention than disclosures in the
notes…’ (Cascino et al. 2013, p. 10), while in the public sector, avoiding the recognition of
liabilities becomes more appealing to policy-makers when government balance sheets attract
attention.
In the Disclosed column, information is placed into the public domain via the notes to the
ﬁnancial statements. This may be required by IAS37/IPSAS19 or by speciﬁc requirements
imposed by the Treasury (2015) inManaging Public Money, some of which originated from com-
mitments made to the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee. When the contingent liab-
ility is unquantiﬁable, that treatment further reduces the likelihood of hostile media coverage that
likes to shock with large numbers. IAS37/IPSAS19 make the distinction between contingent
liabilities and remote contingent liabilities, but do not differentiate clearly between them.
In the third column, there is no obligation to report, either because the contingent liability is
outside the scope of IAS37/IPSAS19 and Managing Public Money or, at the top right of the
ladder, there is nothing to report because the government is deemed to have no obligation. If trans-
actions are structured so that it can be held that there is no obligation, the government is achieving
policy objectives in a way that can be portrayed as costless.
Table 1. Government reporting preferences ladder for guarantees.
Recognized in ﬁnancial
statements
Disclosed within notes but not
recognized
Neither recognized
nor disclosed
No government obligation
Remote unquantiﬁable
contingent liabilitya
Remote quantiﬁable or unquantiﬁable
contingent liabilityb
Unquantiﬁable contingent
liability
Remote quantiﬁable contingent
liabilitya
Quantiﬁable contingent liability
Liability
aIn the ‘Disclosed’ column, contingent liabilities classiﬁed as remote are required to be disclosed under Managing Public
Money (Treasury 2015) when reported to Parliament, though not under IAS37/IPSAS19.
bItems in the ‘Not Disclosed’ column are not required to be disclosed under either Managing Public Money (Treasury
2015) or IAS37/IPSAS19. However, a government committed to ﬁscal transparency might disclose information on a
discretionary basis.
Source: Author construction.
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3. Research methods
To investigate empirically how a government accounts for guarantees, we employed documentary
analysis and in-depth interviews with participants. We began with an analysis of documentary evi-
dence on the development of accounting for guarantees under the four modes of government
accounting. There were several major sources of information. The UK Treasury leads in the pro-
duction of the WGA, which are available on its website, together with its own departmental
accounts. The EC and Eurostat websites provide information on the methods of statistical
accounting used in the EU, together with disclosures of contingent liabilities of Member
States, including guarantees. The ONS website provides speciﬁc UK data on statistical account-
ing. The UK budgetary information is available on the Treasury website. Information on the
development of sustainability projections is available from the EC; in 2010, the Ofﬁce for
Budget Responsibility (OBR) took over UK projections on ﬁscal sustainability.
We sought next to conﬁrm and supplement our understanding gained from public domain
sources through interviews with those involved in policy development and the application of
accounting for guarantee arrangements in government. We beneﬁted from participant-observer
or observer status in certain arenas where policy and standard setting develop. We were able to
identify key actors in the development of public sector accounting reforms through prior personal
contacts or through mutual contacts. We gave undertakings of non-attribution, in view of the con-
tinuing developments of policy and regulations in this area and the controversies surrounding
some of the schemes. We do not identify the particular institutions represented by our intervie-
wees, as the specialized nature of these enquiries would make some individuals recognizable.
We decided not to record the interviews, but to rely instead on handwritten notes, so we
provide our interpretation of the perspectives of interviewees, rather than using quotations
drawn from transcripts.
We conducted 15 interviews between June 2014 and March 2016, with some followed up by
email, telephone or further interviews. The interviewees represented statistical ofﬁces, govern-
ment auditors, accounting practitioners and professional bodies in the EU and the UK. We pre-
pared for each interview on a stand-alone basis, in that we anticipated that each interviewee
would have varying knowledge of accounting procedures under the four modes of government
accounting. For example, discussions with those from statistical ofﬁces concentrated on statistical
accounting and contingent liabilities, those with the professional bodies on ﬁnancial reporting and
those with accounting practitioners on aspects of budgeting. The interviews were designed to
conﬁrm or reject our understanding of particular issues, to guide us towards further public
domain sources of evidence and to help us to understand the technical and political intricacies
underlying the accounting processes (Marginson 2004).
4. How a government accounts for guarantees
This section analyses how a government accounts for guarantees under each mode of accounting.
The sequence of exposition is as follows: accounting standards-based ﬁnancial reporting, statisti-
cal accounting, government budgeting and ﬁscal sustainability projections.
Financial reporting
Accounting for guarantees under IFRS and IPSAS derives from a number of standards. Obli-
gations from guarantees may be recognized as provisions or disclosed as contingent liabilities
(IAS37/IPSAS19). Some guarantee arrangements are recognized or disclosed as ﬁnancial instru-
ments (IAS39, IFRS7 and 9/IPSAS28-30) or accounted as insurance contracts (IFRS4).
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Guarantees relating to entities controlled by a government may be consolidated into the WGA
(where that exists) or treated as some form of joint arrangement (IFRS3 and IFRS10-12/
IPSAS35-38).
IAS37 and IPSAS19 require the recognition of a liability if an outﬂow of resources is
expected, provided that a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. The
amount recognized as a provision should be the best estimate of the expenditure required to
settle the present obligation at the reporting date (IAS37, para. 36; IPSAS19, para. 44). There
may be ‘extremely rare’ cases (IAS37, para. 25; IPSAS19, para. 34) where no reliable estimate
is available, in which case the circumstances are disclosed as a contingent liability. Whether
such circumstances are as rare in practice as envisaged by standard setters may be challenged.
For example, a long-period guarantee might result in an outﬂow of resources at some future
time, given the impact of economic cycles. The timing and extent of this outﬂow may rely
upon estimations, using broad economic assumptions within ﬁnancial models. This resonates
with the distinction between the measurement of liabilities (based on veriﬁable evidence) and
the role of estimation to prescribe an accounting value in Barker and McGeachin (2013). They
suggest (p. 593) that a measurable attribute exists using fair value, but only if there are active
markets to provide an observable measure. This distinction between measurement and estimation
is more important in the case of liabilities than of assets because the implicit conservatism of
accounting has asymmetric effects. Unquantiﬁable assets will fail the recognition test, leading
to conservative reporting of net assets. Excluding liabilities or recognizing them at reduced
values has an anti-conservative effect, leading, ceteris paribus, to an overstatement of net assets.
An obligation not resulting in recognition requires disclosure as a contingent liability (IAS37,
paras 27–8; IPSAS19, paras 35–6), unless the possibility of any outﬂow of resources is ‘remote’
(IAS37, paras 84–92; IPSAS19, paras 100–9). There is no deﬁnition provided in the standards of
what is remote, as opposed to merely unlikely, but the intention appears to be to avoid disclosure
of potential obligations that are so obscure or unlikely that their reporting would be misleading.
Government departments need Treasury approval before entering into guarantee arrangements
(Treasury 2017a), such approvals then being reported to Parliament as a Written Ministerial State-
ment (Rudd 2015). Contingent liabilities such as guarantees (including those for which the risk of
crystallization is remote) are required to be reported in departmental accounts and in the WGA
(Treasury 2017a, p. 10). Certain guarantees might fall within exemptions from disclosure on
grounds of impracticality or where disclosure would prejudice the position of the entity
(IAS37, paras 91–2; IPSAS19, paras 108–9).
A ﬁnancial guarantee contract exists when speciﬁc payments are required to reimburse the
holder of the guarantee under the terms of a debt instrument (IAS39, para. 9; IPSAS29, para.
10; IFRS9, p. A323). Such contracts are recognized initially at their fair value, which is negative
and creates a liability. The liability is restated subsequently at the higher of (a) the amount recog-
nized under IAS37/IPSAS19 and (b) either the amount initially recognized less cumulative amor-
tization or at fair value, with any change in value recognized through the income statement
(IAS39, para. 47; IPSAS29, para. 49c; IFRS9, p. A313). Groups of ﬁnancial guarantee contracts
with similar terms and risks may be assessed on a portfolio basis (IAS37, para. 39).
Finally, guarantees may be accounted as insurance contracts under IFRS4. In the UK, the only
government department applying IFRS4 to signiﬁcant contracts is UK Export Finance (UKEF),
the UK’s export credit agency (Financial Reporting Advisory Board 2017). There are various
liability adequacy requirements, linked to the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle
present obligations (IFRS4, paras 15–9).
The UK Treasury has indicated that most government guarantees are recognized initially at
fair value under IAS39 and subsequently at amortized cost or at expected value under IAS37
(Financial Reporting Advisory Board 2013, paras 78–9). The initial recognition of a provision
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equates with the price charged for the guarantee, which is intended to take into consideration
expected losses. The NAO questioned whether this reﬂects fully the risks incurred and rec-
ommended that the Treasury develop an additional pricing methodology (NAO 2015, p. 11).
Although the Treasury (2017a) published new guidance on contingent liability approval, it has
not followed this recommendation.
The UK Treasury (2017b) accounts for the year ended 31 March 2017 and the WGA for the
year ended 31 March 2016 (Treasury 2017c), together with earlier editions, provide information
on ﬁnancial guarantee obligations. Table 2 provides a summary of the provisions and contingent
liabilities from 2010–11 to 2016–17.
The Help to Buy mortgage guarantee scheme provides guarantees for around 15% of mort-
gage loans of personal buyers of properties costing up to £600,000. The Treasury’s accounts
report maximum potential losses of £1.443 billion at 31 March 2017, with £89 million recognized
as a ﬁnancial guarantee liability. The scheme closed to new applications after June 2017, and there
have been few claims under the scheme (Treasury 2017b, p. 90).
The National Loan Guarantee Scheme (NLGS) was launched in 2012 to provide guarantees
to participating banks to reduce the costs of borrowing by small businesses. The contingent liab-
ility of £2.9 billion represents the total bonds issued under this scheme. The NLGS closed in May
2017, and both the provision and the contingent liability are likely to be eliminated by the end of
March 2018 (Treasury 2017b, pp. 89–90).
The UK Guarantees Scheme provides ‘ … an unconditional and irrevocable guarantee to the
lenders to infrastructure projects… ’ (NAO 2015, p. 5). On 31 March 2017, eight projects had
been supported leading to a provision of £109 million and related contingent liabilities of £1.1
billion. There are further projects pre-qualiﬁed for future approval, including HPC, which are
likely to increase these obligations substantially in future years (Treasury 2017b, p. 89).
The Credit Guarantee Scheme, which was initiated following the banking crisis, expired in
2011–12. Deposit Guarantees are largely eliminated from 2013–14 as a result of the consolidation
of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley into the Treasury accounts.
Table 2 illustrates that the contingent liabilities of the UK Treasury reduced signiﬁcantly by
2013–14, but have begun to increase as a new generation of guarantee schemes is implemented.
Strikingly, provisions for ﬁnancial guarantees are small but contingent liabilities are very large.
Similarly, contingent liabilities (middle column of the Government Reporting Preferences
Ladder in Table 1) dominate provisions for guarantees (left column) in the WGA. Guarantees
to support ﬁnancial institutions, following the banking crisis, have reduced as a result of the
release of guarantee obligations to Royal Bank of Scotland and the sale of public shareholdings
of Lloyds Banking Group. Provisions for ﬁnancial guarantees are around £4 billion up to 2013–
14, relating largely to Network Rail (the railtrack operator in Great Britain) which was reclassiﬁed
into the public sector from 2014–15. The WGA provision in 2014–15 and 2015–16 was only £0.4
billion; the make-up of this is not disclosed but would include provisions made in the Treasury’s
own accounts. Other WGA provisions have increased substantially from 2010–11 to 2015–16,
reﬂecting factors such as increasing expected payouts for nuclear decommissioning and clinical
negligence, new government obligations under pension protection schemes and a lower interest
rate used in 2015–16 to discount future obligations.
Whole-of-government quantiﬁable contingent liabilities under IAS37 and quantiﬁable remote
contingent liabilities reported to Parliament are also shown in Table 2. As with provisions,
between 2010–11 and 2012–13, the disclosures reﬂect the unwinding of government guarantees
following the banking crisis. Increases in these contingent liabilities since then represent a com-
bination of higher potential payouts and lower discount rates. The WGA gives details of the
nature of the more signiﬁcant items, together with a descriptive list of non-quantiﬁable contingent
liabilities (Treasury 2017c, p. 106–13).
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Table 2. Government ﬁnancial reporting of guarantees.
Years ended 31 March 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Treasury Accounts (£ million)
Financial Guarantee Provisions 1,540 600 763 206 291 270 201
Of which:
Help-to-Buy mortgage guarantees 9 53 84 89
National Loan Guarantee Scheme 246 185 125 64 3
UK Guarantees Scheme 7 113 122 109
Credit Guarantee Scheme 941 41
Deposit Guarantees (Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley) 599 559 517 5
Contingent Liabilities 135,600 38,000 16,755 3,150 4,416 4,967 5,443
Of which:
Help-to-Buy mortgage guarantees 95 631 1,067 1,443
National Loan Guarantee Scheme 2,900 2,900 2,900 2,900 2,900
UK Guarantees Scheme 83 885 1,000 1,100
Credit Guarantee Scheme 115,000 24,200
Guarantees relating to Northern Rock 15,400 10,600 10,994 72
Guarantees relating to Bradford & Bingley 5,200 3,200 2,861
Whole-of-Government Accounts (£ billion)
Provisions for Financial Guarantees 5.2 4.2 4.2 4.0 0.4 0.4
Of which:
Current 0.1 0.1
Non-current 5.2 4.1 4.2 4.0 0.4 0.3
Contingent Liabilities under IAS37 49.5 100.8 87.9 63.0 76.4 104.3
Of which:
Guarantees relating to Northern Rock 1.6 1.9 1.9
Export guarantees and insurance policies 9.7 9.9 12.7 12.1 13.4 11.6
Transport infrastructure projects 2.6 2.3 3.4 3.4 3.8 4.5
Remote Contingent Liabilities Reported to Parliament 377.6 160.3 85.1 104.9 65.5 85.3
Of which:
Credit Guarantee Scheme 115.0 24.2
Royal Bank of Scotland 110.0 54.7
Bradford & Bingley and Northern Rock 20.6 14.3 11.9
Transport infrastructure projects 29.1 31.3 34.4 37.0 6.8 6.7
Loans guaranteed under EU Schemes 4.0 6.3 9.6 9.8 9.1 11.6
Note: Data for WGA year end 2017 are not yet available; the 2015–2016 WGAwas not published until 13 July 2017.
Source: Extracted from the Annual Reports and Accounts of HM Treasury 2011–2017 and of UK Whole of Government Accounts 2011–2016.
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The provisions recognized as liabilities are relatively small and even the quantiﬁable contin-
gent liabilities seem modest in relation to levels of recognized liabilities for government borrow-
ings, future pension obligations, clinical negligence and nuclear decommissioning. This might
lead to a view that guarantees are unimportant in the wider context of ﬁscal transparency and sus-
tainability. However, the low visibility of these obligations gives cause for concern. The obli-
gations could be increasing signiﬁcantly as schemes are launched or extended and, to the
extent that they are not considered to give rise to immediate expenditure, they do not increase
deﬁcits or liabilities, so helping governments to point to ‘success’ in controlling public expendi-
ture. For example, the WGA (Treasury 2017c, p. 112) outlines the agreement to build HPC but
does not refer explicitly to any ‘guarantee’, although it discloses that the fair value of expected
payments is £26.8 billion. The Treasury accounts (Treasury 2017b, p. 89) refer to HPC in the
note covering events after the reporting period; it discloses that an initial guarantee of £2
billion has been approved to support construction and that ‘ … a guarantee of up to £13.1
billion may be considered thereafter’.
The underlying issue is that the structure of ﬁnancial reporting is such that risk (through unrec-
ognized commitments) may be increasing while expenditure is not, because these obligations are
largely or entirely off-balance sheet. The initial impact of entering into these agreements involves
little or no recognized expenditure, with most obligations disclosed as contingent liabilities. Any
provision of a ﬁnancial guarantee liability, measured at fair value, is likely to be matched with the
recognition of an asset representing future revenue from the cost-covering guarantee fee. The
NAO (2015) Report on the UK Guarantees Scheme concluded that the Treasury had not con-
sidered the overall value-for-money of projects ﬁnanced by the Scheme but, instead, had used
the narrower test of whether fees charged for providing guarantees represented a market price
for these risks. The NAO criticized the reporting of guarantees because there was no disclosure
of the assumed probability of default or the duration of exposure and it recommended that the
Treasury should report annually to Parliament on the level of risks associated with the govern-
ment’s portfolio of guarantees and on measures to mitigate risks. The Treasury’s 2016–17
accounts (Treasury 2017b) provide descriptions and durations, but no information on the prob-
ability of default.
Statistical accounting
Some differences of operational practice from ﬁnancial reporting should be highlighted. A
key step is delineating economic actors (known as ‘institutional units’) and then allocating
these institutional units to sectors with reference to the principle of control (Eurostat
2013a, para. 1.36).6 Changes in regulation between successive versions of the ESA can
result in particular units being reallocated from one sector to another. For example, the tigh-
tening of control criteria in ESA10 led the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) to reclassify
Network Rail to the public sector, whereas it had been allocated to the private sector under
ESA95 (ONS 2013).
The national accounts do not generally include provisions as the debt supported by the guar-
antee is recorded already as a liability of the borrower and an asset of the lender under the quad-
ruple-entry system. This difference is illustrated in the reconciliation between the net liabilities of
the 31 March 2016 UK WGA balance sheet of £1,986 billion and public sector net debt based on
the national accounts of £1,606 billion: WGA provisions of £306 billion are an important com-
ponent of the net difference (Treasury 2017c, p. 143).
A guarantee is normally recognized as a government liability in national accounts only if it
crystallizes to require government funding (Eurostat 2016, p. 396). However, accounting for
three types of explicit government guarantee is required by ESA10:
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. in the form of derivatives, which are to be treated in the same way as in non-government
sectors;
. in the form of standardized guarantees which are ‘issued in large number, usually for a
fairly small amount, [along] identical lines’ (Eurostat 2016, p. 391): examples relate to
student loans and low-income housing loans, for which expected losses can be calculated
on a portfolio basis and established as a liability at inception;
. in the form of one-off guarantees, usually for large amounts, which may be motivated to
allow the borrower to secure a loan or to pay a lower interest rate.
This tightening of statistical regulations occurred as part of the process of updating them (Euro-
pean Council 2013, recital 7) and to help prevent innovative ﬁnancial arrangements undermining
the application of the Stability and Growth Pact and the associated EDP.
In the context of statistical accounting, one-off guarantees have the advantage to governments
that they are not recognized as public expenditure, being regarded as contingent liabilities. The
complexity and lack of transparency of guarantees is an advantage for those governments
wishing to window dress their public ﬁnance numbers. Such ﬁnancial arrangements take a
long time to unravel and by then the policy objective may have been achieved by moving to
the right or upwards on the Government Reporting Preferences Ladder.
Guarantees can be issued by governments to institutional units within the general government
and to those units classiﬁed to the private sector. There are opportunities to arbitrage between locat-
ing guarantee obligations within the general government (on which ESA reports) and the public
sector (which includes public corporations outside the general government). In some countries, guar-
antees are given to public corporations that are not viable, with no guarantee fee being charged.
Another concern is that guarantee fees, whether in relation to public corporations or private entities,
are treated as government revenue (thereby reducing deﬁcits now), without there being recognition
or disclosure of future liabilities under those guarantees (European Commission 2015b).
However, there are some safeguards. First, regulations in ESA10 and in the Manual on Gov-
ernment Deﬁcit and Debt (Eurostat 2016) are designed to challenge (and record as capital trans-
fers) loans to government units with implausible repayment possibilities and similarly to consider
whether guarantees to private units are likely to be called upon. ESA10 innovated the category of
‘standardized guarantees’ where a liability can be estimated based on expected costs (Eurostat
2016, p. 399). This results in what is effectively a ‘provision for calls under standardized guaran-
tees’ (Lequiller 2015, p. 35). Another enforcement device is the ‘three calls rule’, whereby full
debt assumption by government is automatic if the government directly or indirectly services
the guaranteed debt on three occasions (Eurostat 2016, p. 393).
Second, national statistical ofﬁces and Eurostat are located within the government information
perimeter and have unrivalled access to source documents: they do not face the redactions con-
fronted by parliaments and the public. National accounts are based on the economic substance of
transactions, so it is possible for them to go behind the legal forms. Eurostat can reallocate, to the
general government sector, institutional units that governments claim to be public corporations or
private businesses.
Third, improved statistical accounting data on guarantees in EU Member States derive
directly from the tightening of surveillance after the 2011 Eurozone crisis. One element of the
so-called ‘six pack’ was Council Directive 2011/85/EU on ‘requirements for budgetary frame-
works of the Member States’ (European Council 2011). Article 14(3) requires Member States to:
… publish relevant information on contingent liabilities with potentially large effects on public
budgets, including government guarantees, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public
corporations, including the extent thereof.
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Accordingly, EU Member States face reporting requirements that go beyond ESA10, framed as
supplements to the high-proﬁle EDP questionnaire (Eurostat 2013b). This requirement led to
the publication of a report (European Commission 2015a) to the European Parliament and the
European Council after Eurostat’s ﬁrst publication of these data.
There are marked variations in 2015 across the 28 Member States on the three categories of
contingent liabilities (Eurostat 2017). Government guarantees/GDP range from 0.0% (Slovakia)
to 28.3% (Finland), liabilities related to off-balance sheet PPPs range from 0.0% (several
countries) to 3.4% (Portugal) and liabilities of government-controlled entities classiﬁed outside
the general government range from 1.6% (Slovakia) to 110.4% (Germany, where these are
mostly attributable to public sector banks). The 2015 government guarantees/GDP data show a
wide variation within the above range, with several countries’ data footnoted as incomplete
and requiring extended coverage in future reporting years.
As announced in an annual press release (Eurostat 2017), Eurostat’s database for the 28 EU
Member States provides calendar year data for 2010–15,7 expressed as a percentage of GDP.
These are derived from returns prepared by national statistical ofﬁces and published on their
own websites. The UK data in Table 3 are striking in two ways. First, the total stock of guar-
antees falls sharply from 27.52% in 2010 to 10.24% in 2012. This represents the unwinding of
guarantees to the ﬁnancial sector arising from the 2008 crisis. Second, standardized guarantees
in the UK do not appear in the data until 2013 and remain at a negligible level (0.06% in 2015).
Examples given by Eurostat of standardized guarantees are mortgage loan guarantees and
student loan guarantees. UK guarantees relate to the Help-to-Buy scheme, whereas student
loans are issued from within the general government (Student Loans Company) and export
credit guarantees are outside the general government.8 The UK ﬁscal risks derive from the pipe-
lines of future projects that develop when guarantees become established as a means of funding
assets such as infrastructure, without counting in public expenditure aggregates, budget deﬁcits
and public debt.
Eurostat (2017, Annex 1) explains that ‘While the provisions for standardized guarantees are
considered an actual liability, the total stock of assets covered by standardized guarantee is
regarded as a contingent liability’. For this reason, contingent liabilities as percentages of GDP
should not be added to debt/GDP ratios; otherwise, there would be some double counting.
Whatever the imperfections of country data, contingent liabilities have been highlighted as a
threat to ﬁscal transparency and sustainability. For those guarantees that fall within Eurostat’s
remit and data, disclosure of the categories and ﬁnancial volumes of guarantees can support trans-
parency through analysis of the movement of transactions on the Government Reporting
Table 3. Statistical reporting of UK Government guarantees.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Eurostat reporting (% of GDP)
One-off guarantees
of which:
27.52 15.32 10.24 9.32 8.80 8.64
public corporations 7.71 3.94 4.00 3.36 3.35 3.51
ﬁnancial corporations 19.42 5.29 4.64 3.98 3.86 4.01
Standardized guarantees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06
Total Stock of Guarantees 27.52 15.32 10.24 9.33 8.84 8.69
Note: All UK guarantees are issued by central government, a category that includes the devolved administrations in
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. ONS has found no evidence of any signiﬁcant guarantees issued by local
government.
Source: Eurostat database (accessed 8 July 2017).
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Preferences Ladder. However, Eurostat (2017, Annex 2) lists four exclusions from these pub-
lished data on contingent liabilities:
(1) ‘Government guarantees issued within the guarantee mechanism under the Framework
Agreement of the European Financial Stability Facility [EFSF]’: Eurostat decided that
the debt of the EFSF should be attributed proportionately to Member States’ national
debt, effectively treating the temporary EFSF as an empty shell.9
(2) ‘Derivative-type guarantees meeting the ESA2010 deﬁnition of a ﬁnancial derivative’:
these are already recognized in national accounts as government liabilities.
(3) ‘Deposit insurance guarantees and comparable schemes’: since these schemes cover all
eligible bank deposits, they represent very large amounts compared with other govern-
ment guarantees, and therefore would potentially dwarf other government guarantees,
thereby reducing the usefulness of the aggregate ﬁgures. More controversially, it has
been argued that there is a low probability of signiﬁcant calls across many ﬁnancial insti-
tutions at the same time.
(4) ‘Government guarantees issued on events [for] which occurrence is very difﬁcult to cover
via commercial insurance (earthquakes, large scale ﬂooding, etc.)’: these are character-
ized by low probability and potentially huge uncertain costs. Such exclusions are analo-
gous to the IAS37 exclusion of remote contingencies on the grounds of being misleading.
Items (1) and (2) are included in the national accounts of each country. Items (3) and (4) represent
examples of the implicit guarantees that governments give to their economies and are uncertain
and potentially huge.
Budgetary accounting
Whether and how guarantees show up in budgetary documents depend, inter alia, on the adopted
measurement basis (nothing will show under cash accounting unless payments are expected
during the budget period), the coverage of budgetary documents (guarantees may be granted
by off-budget institutions or funds) and the degree of aggregation of the budget documents
(values may fall below reporting thresholds). Notwithstanding national prerogatives to control
budgetary documentation, these will come under pressure from harmonized government ﬁnancial
reporting and from the use of statistical accounting for external surveillance.
The budgetary amounts provided in the UK Central Government Supply Estimates (Treasury
2017d) align with the subsequent ﬁnancial reporting basis (Treasury 2017e), a feature that was
designed in the Treasury (1995) proposals for Resource Accounting and Budgeting. Financial
guarantee contracts impact on budgets in several ways. A cost is recognized when the guarantee
is provided, based on its measurement in the balance sheet, and budget income is recognized for
guarantee fees. Amortization or revaluation of the liability is recognized as a budgetary cost or
income on an annual basis. Payments resulting from the guarantee are counted against spending
departments’ capital expenditure limits (Treasury 2017e, paras 8.29–8.31). The UK budgetary
accounting system thus, atypically, aligns budgetary accounting with ﬁnancial reporting
treatment.
Fiscal sustainability projections
Long-term ﬁscal projections are on a cash basis; assumptions are required of the amounts for
which, and the years when, guarantees will be called. This is more judgemental than allowing
for the construction of physical infrastructures or the modelling of ageing costs. Fiscal gaps
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are unaffected if the present value of guarantee fees offsets the present value of calls and admin-
istrative costs. However, the potential for large future calls, though believed to be improbable, is a
potential threat to sustainability. With regard to guarantees, the incremental information provided
by such projections relates to the build-up of future potential calls on guarantees as the stock of
guarantees increases.
Summary
Two conclusions emerge. First, guarantees bring genuine uncertainty of outcome: multiple
accounting standards and porous accounting boundaries can generate opaqueness rather than
transparency, notwithstanding that having multiple perspectives could promote greater under-
standing. Second, a tightening of standards can encourage the development of policy instruments
designed to exclude obligations from headline numbers.
5. Interpretations
This paper has established that obligations arising from guarantees raise complex technical issues
and that accounting for them is contestable. Our examples of UK government guarantee arrange-
ments conﬁrm that existing provisions and contingent liabilities are not numerically signiﬁcant in
the context of total government liabilities. However, there is the potential for guarantee liabilities
to grow in importance because of weak public ﬁnances and low economic growth. Governments
seek to ﬁnd ways to fund infrastructure programmes and to support ﬁnancial institutions within
the context of austerity-driven policies.
The dichotomy of treatment between recognition by provisioning for losses and disclosure,
without recognition, of contingent liabilities is a feature of accounting that is consistent
between public and private sectors. However, the nature of government and the scope and
scale of its guarantees provide features that go beyond those in a commercial setting.
First, the demands of ﬁscal transparency and the absence of conventional limited liability of
governments require more extensive reporting than in the corporate sector. We see evidence of
this under the ﬁnancial reporting mode, where the UK government has extended the disclosures
in the WGA beyond IAS37/IPSAS19 to include remote contingent liabilities. These disclosures
promote greater ﬁscal transparency, but leave open the issue of how far should ‘remoteness’ be
taken before potential obligations are so unlikely that their inclusion in the accounts becomes
misleading.
Second, the ability to measure rather than having to estimate (Barker and McGeachin 2013) is
a particularly complex one in a public sector setting. It is unlikely that there will be an active
market for government guarantees to identify a market price to determine fair value. Indeed, it
may be government policy to retain such obligations within the public sector, as the cost of
risk transfer into commercial markets may be excessive.
Third, the distinction between one-off and standardized guarantees, used in statistical account-
ing, is helpful. It may be possible to determine the expected outcome of a portfolio of standardized
guarantees by drawing upon past occurrences of similar arrangements, while such data will be
unavailable for one-off guarantees. In either case, the disclosure of a range of outcomes and
their expected likelihood will be useful to make transparent the decision on whether or not to
recognize a liability and to show the basis of computing expected value.
In the context of the Miller and Power framework, the adoption of accounting mechanisms
represents an intensiﬁed territorializing of the government sector. For example, economic
events not recognized in traditional cash-based accounting systems are captured routinely
within accrual-based ﬁnancial reporting systems.
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The complexities that underlie the decisions on recognition and/or disclosure of guarantees
support the mediating role of accounting, which links actors together to provide a basis that
‘permits neutrality to be claimed for accounting expertise’ (Miller and Power 2013, p. 562). In
the calculations of accounting, the mediating role cannot remove the subjectivity arising from
incomplete information, but it may support competing or collaborating actors in making the
case for a particular course of action: for example, that there will be no cost to the guarantee
with claims covered by fees charged for the arrangement. Similarly, the adjudicating role of
accounting will be signiﬁcant if the use of guarantees can provide governments with ﬂexibility
to avoid or delay the reporting of deﬁcits and increases in public debt.
The application of statistical accounting rules indicates how the adjudicating and subjectiviz-
ing roles of accounting apply to EU Member States. They are subject to formal limits on deﬁcits
and debt ratios, above which the EDP process may be applied (adjudication) but are free to choose
methods of ﬁnancing within the application of those limits (subjectivization). The subjectivizing
role of accounting is not neutral; it may promote or restrain particular methods of ﬁnancing. For
example, the general absence of provisions in statistical accounting may lead governments to
issue guarantees in preference to public sector debt.
Guarantees pose technical difﬁculties for both ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting
standard setters and practitioners. The context is one in which there are explicit and coded mess-
ages from policy-makers that accounting should not disrupt their preferred policies. In terms of
the Government Reporting Preferences Ladder (Table 1), standard setters wish to have recog-
nition when there is a probable economic outﬂow (Column 1) and disclosure where there is a
possible economic outﬂow (Column 2). Data acquisition is a signiﬁcant obstacle, especially
when guarantees and other contingent liabilities are incurred by many government entities or
when governments do not wish to reveal the potential ﬁnancial costs of their policies. For
example, in relation to the UK Autumn Statement of 2016, the OBR (2016, p. 3) reported:
… at each forecast we also ask the Treasury to detail any newly created contingent liabilities that
might pose a risk to our forecast. On this occasion, we asked speciﬁcally whether any contingent
liabilities had been created in respect of assurances provided to Nissan and the Treasury declined
to say.
This relates to assurances provided by the UK Government to Nissan, the Japanese car manufac-
turer, in order to persuade it to reverse plans to cancel future investment in the aftermath of the
June 2016 referendum that will lead to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.
At the European level, Eurostat has taken advantage of the circumstances created by the Euro-
zone crisis to secure a mandatory system of country reporting (Eurostat 2013b) that would other-
wise have been unacceptable. There are conﬂicting pressures: the EC wishes to enforce budgetary
discipline on Member States while creating its own off-balance sheet vehicle in the form of the
EFSI.
Miller and Power’s (2013) interpretation of how accounting leads to the economization of
organizational life, through territorializing, mediating, adjudicating and subjectivizing, has
proved useful for interpreting the linkages of accounting for guarantees to the wider issues of
ﬁscal transparency and surveillance.
The territorializing inﬂuences of government accounting within the EU enable its Member
States to be constituted as calculable spaces which, in turn, supports the other three roles of
accounting in the Miller and Power framework. Territorializing activities reafﬁrms the importance
of consolidation practices to determine what is constituted as ‘government’ for accounting pur-
poses. Financial reporting in the UK has culminated in the WGA, which provides a wider per-
spective and makes boundary issues more difﬁcult to manipulate as government liabilities,
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such as guarantees, are subject to more than one mode of accounting. Statistical accounting
focuses on the general government, leaving vulnerabilities beyond that boundary, as illustrated
by the exclusion of guarantees provided by entities outside the general government sector from
data reported by Eurostat. This manipulation of guarantees inside or outside of the general gov-
ernment boundary makes it difﬁcult to draw conclusions from the comparison of international
data.
The mediating role of accounting enables actors and activities to be linked together and com-
parability asserted. This paper has conﬁrmed that mediating interactions have developed between
ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting through the spread of accrual accounting. These
interactions are promoting the globalization of standard setting and possible further isolation of
budgeting from these two modes of government accounting. The IMF (2014) has promoted
ﬁscal transparency and ﬁscal sustainability reporting. The IPSASB (2014b) is seeking to
remove unnecessary differences between ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting. Eurostat
(2013b, 2016) has extended the reporting by EU Member States through the disclosure require-
ments of one-off/standardized guarantees, the ‘three calls’ rule and mandatory contingent liability
reporting.
The adjudicating role of accounting implies that elected governments can be judged and pun-
ished on the basis of accounting numbers. The examination of ﬁnancial reporting showed how
complex is the provisioning for guarantees, while the discussion on statistical accounting high-
lighted weaknesses deriving from the general absence of provisions in national accounts. Budget-
ing processes are more diverse internationally. Cash-based budgets are unlikely to disclose the
future impact of guarantees in view of the long periods required for most guarantees to crystallize
into required payments; accrual-based budgets are limited by their relatively short-term predic-
tions of future costs. Long-term ﬁscal sustainability projections are useful in considering trends
but are reliant upon stylized assumptions and dominated by demographic trends, such as
ageing populations.
Adjudicating is shifting more to an international level, with intensiﬁed ﬁscal surveillance orig-
inating from IMF concerns about hidden ﬁscal risks and from the creation of the EU Stability and
Growth Pact. We see this explicitly in the application of the EDP regime based on ceilings on
deﬁcit and debt. There have been attempts to improve disclosure in both ﬁnancial reporting
(through IPSAS standards on provisions and contingencies) and statistical accounting (through
Eurostat requirements for country-level reporting of contingent liabilities). Despite this, the
reporting of liabilities arising from guarantees is neither consistent nor adequate for the adjudicat-
ing role. The limitations arise from the inherent uncertainty in the ﬁnancial outcomes of guaran-
tees (including the possibility of a contagion effect resulting in the crystallization of obligations)
and the drafting of guarantee contracts to push legal obligations outside of (whatever is reported
as) government.
The subjectivizing role of accounting aligns with the centralization of political authority at the
Member State or EU level. However, entities are capable of some degree of resistance within the
constraints imposed by higher political authorities or by capital markets. The extent to which rules
on public ﬁnances are generated by bodies perceived as distant, such as the EU, has taken
decisions away from more conventional locations, such as national parliaments. The timescales
of guarantee commitments are likely to exceed the horizons of political decision-makers. In
such contexts, resistance may take the form of subverting reporting systems, by formal compli-
ance providing nominal transparency, combined with ever-more-complicated contractual terms
that limit effective transparency.
The Government Reporting Preferences Ladder illustrates how resistance to subjectivization
can take the form of moving from recognition of liabilities, through disclosure to policy structur-
ing so that government obligations are deemed not to exist. Whether this is preventable depends
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partly upon the effectiveness of various forms of scrutiny over the development and reporting of
guarantee arrangements. In the UK context, this includes the inﬂuence of the NAO on ﬁnancial
reporting, the OBR on budgets and ﬁscal sustainability projections, and the IMF in its ﬁscal trans-
parency evaluations. The IMF’s (2016) Fiscal Transparency Evaluation of the UK highlighted
ﬁscal risks, including guarantees, as a severe weakness. Such organizations may help to reduce
the potential for diminished ﬁscal transparency arising from the complexity of arrangements
and the use of commercial-in-conﬁdence clauses to take matters out of the public domain.
There are limitations to the research methods adopted for this paper. We examine develop-
ments which have not yet matured. When public domain evidence is limited during early inves-
tigation of an area of accounting, researchers must seek to go ‘below the radar’ in order to
establish what is happening and how decision-makers view developments. There may be a
gulf between what is on the public record and concerns expressed off-record. Examples
include fears about hidden ﬁscal risks and poor value-for-money resulting from contractual
arrangements shaped by whether or not transactions will be recognized or disclosed or not
reported. Few of our interviewees appeared to believe that guarantee arrangements are determined
by value-for-money considerations, although that message for public consumption becomes
increasingly polished.
6. Conclusion
Our analysis sees ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting as separate modes of government
accounting drawn together under the inﬂuence of international agencies. In contrast, budgeting
practices are still the preserve of each nation state, while long-term ﬁscal sustainability projections
are in their infancy and have limited inﬂuence in determining the use and nature of guarantee
arrangements. The Miller and Power framework can be used to analyse future changes in these
relationships; within the EU, the subjectivizing role of accounting might result in pressure on
Member States to adopt more consistent budgeting practices and bring closer the linkages with
statistical accounting. Political consensus on the need for more infrastructure spending without
damaging reported measures of the public ﬁnances suggests that guarantee arrangements will
become increasingly attractive to governments. The extent to which public audit ofﬁces and
ﬁscal councils are enabled and willing to challenge government practices is an important part
of such a research agenda.
There are opportunities for accounting academics to undertake research on the growth and
treatment of guarantees and to contribute to knowledge exchange. Particular areas are (a) studying
the interactions of ﬁnancial reporting and statistical accounting standard setters on the inter-
national stage, and (b) undertaking comparative case studies of how individual countries
account for guarantees, a task that requires deep institutional knowledge as well as understanding
of complex standards. Academics can maintain independence from hierarchical policy systems
that practitioners, subjected to political authority or commercial pressures, cannot always main-
tain. National statistical ofﬁces may come under pressure from ﬁnance ministries, while Eurostat
is in a weak position in relation to the EC’s own off-balance sheet activity. Achievement of effec-
tive ﬁscal transparency will in part depend on the robustness and timeliness of the evidence that
academics can provide.
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Notes
1. HPC will be built and operated by a consortium led by French government-owned EdF and the state-
owned China General Nuclear Corporation. An initial guarantee of £2 billion has been provided by the
UK Government to support bond issues to ﬁnance construction. The consortium will receive a guaran-
teed price of £92.50 (in 2012 prices and adjusted by changes in the Consumer Prices Index) for each
megawatt-hour of electricity generated from HPC sold into the market for the ﬁrst 35 years of operation.
This is more than twice the average cost of electricity on wholesale markets between 2010 and 2017.
The proposal is structured so that excess generating costs fall upon the electricity generators and
then upon consumers (European Commission 2014) so that it will not be reported as a liability or con-
tingent liability of the UK Government (National Audit Ofﬁce (NAO) 2017).
2. Implicit guarantees are unbounded, arising from government’s role as provider of last resort after, for
example, earthquakes, terrorism incidents and failure of the banking system.
3. For example, the European Commission (EC) has launched the European Fund for Strategic Invest-
ments (EFSI), an infrastructure ﬁnancing vehicle that is an off-shoot of the European Investment
Bank (EIB), which itself is not consolidated in the EC accounts. The EFSI is supported by a €16
billion guarantee from the EU budget (EIB 2015) and has been described as having the potential to
create a ‘shadow budget’ operating in parallel with EU and national budgets (Sinn 2015).
4. For example, if a government has treated a loan guarantee as a contingent liability but then switches to it
being recognized as a liability, this does not necessarily imply that the original borrower will treat the
guarantee as an asset or will derecognize the loan liability.
5. For example, the payment of a capital grant by government to a private sector corporation would be
recorded twice in the accounts of the government and twice in the accounts of the corporation.
6. ‘For the purposes of ESA10, the institutional units are grouped together into ﬁve mutually exclusive
domestic institutional sectors: (a) non-ﬁnancial corporations; (b) ﬁnancial corporations; (c) general gov-
ernment; (d) households; (e) non-proﬁt institutions serving households. The ﬁve sectors together make
up the total domestic economy’ (Eurostat 2013a, para. 1.57).
7. Although the ONS publishes these data for UK ﬁnancial years, they are treated by Eurostat as equivalent
to calendar years.
8. The importance of boundary deﬁnition is highlighted by UKEF being classiﬁed as a public ﬁnancial
corporation. This takes it outside general government and therefore outside Table 3’s standardized guar-
antees data. Provisions for guarantees, but not contingent liabilities, are included in ‘liabilities of gov-
ernment-controlled entities classiﬁed outside general government’ (Eurostat 2017).
9. As from 2012, the temporary EFSF has been replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a
permanent EU agency based in Luxembourg which is not consolidated in the accounts of the EC and is
classiﬁed to European Union Institutions (i.e. not attributed to Member States, as done for the EFSF).
The liabilities of the ESM are off the balance sheet of both Member States and the EC.
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